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INTRODUCTION

The international minimum standards of intellectual property
protection set out in the TRIPS Agreement' will eventually determine the
level of competition for knowledge goods that are sold or licensed on the
global market that emerged from the Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization ("WTO Agreement") of 1994.2 The extent to which
these standards will exert pro- or anti-competitive effects on global
commerce remains to be seen and will, in my view, depend in part on how
the developing countries implement them
3 after the five-year transitional
period, which expired on January 1, 2000.
As is now widely known, the TRIPS component of the WTO
Agreement represented a revolution in international intellectual property
law.4 Although it built on the Paris and Berne conventions of 1883 and
1886, respectively, 5 TRIPS went well beyond the original anti-copying

See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, April 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization [hereinafter
WTO Agreement], Annex 1C, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
2

See generally MICHAEL BLAKENEY, TRADE-RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL

PROPERTY

RIGHTS:

A

CONCISE

GUIDE

TO

THE

TRIPS

AGREEMENT

45-107

(1996)(discussing the rights protected in TRIPS); J. WATAL, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS IN THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION:

THE WAY FORWARD

FOR DEVELOPING

COUNTRIES (forthcoming 2000); J.H. Reichman, Universal Minimum Standards of
Intellectual Property Protection Under the TRIPs Component of the WTO Agreement, in
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE: THE TRIPS AGREEMENT 21
(Carlos M. Correa & Abdulqawi A. Yusuf eds., 1998) [hereinafter Reichman, Universal
Minimum Standards].
3 See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, art. 65. Developing countries and former
socialist countries have five years in which to delay application of TRIPS standards,
other than national treatment and most-favored-nation rules. Least-developed countries
(LDCs) enjoy an eleven-year period of transition. See id. art. 66. See generally Adrian
Otten, Implementation of the TRIPS Agreement and Prospects for its Future
Development, 1 J. INT'L ECON. L. 523, 529-30 (1998).
4 For the nature and limits of this revolution, see J.H. Reichman, From Free Riders
to FairFollowers: Global Competition Under the TRIPS Agreement, 29 N.Y.U. J. INT'L
L. & POL 11, 13-16, 26-86 (1996-97) [hereinafter Reichman, From Free Riders to Fair
Followers].
5 See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, arts. 1(3), 2(1); Paris Convention for the
Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, as last revised at Stockholm, July 14,
1967, 25 Stat. 1372, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 [hereinafter Paris Convention]; Berne Convention
for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, as last revised at Paris,
July 24, 1971, S. TREATY Doc. No. 99-27, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter Berne
Convention].
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objectives of the drafters. It imposed a comprehensive set of relatively high
international minimum standards governing copyrighted literary and artistic

works (including computer programs), rights related to copyright law
(including sound recordings), patents, trademarks, geographical indications
of origin, trade secrets, industrial designs, integrated circuit designs 7 and
8
even (indirectly) unfair competition. It does not cover competition law, as
such, although it touches on related issues, 9 especially licensing
agreements.1°
TRIPS also mandated a detailed set of enforcement procedures, that is
to say, rules of judicial and administrative conduct for all states, including a
duty to reject counterfeit trademarked and pirated copyright goods at the
borders of all member countries." Finally, it established speedy and tough
dispute-settlement machinery within the WTO framework, which leads, in
the end, to the possibility of cross-collateral trade sanctions for non6

See, e.g., Gail E. Evans, Intellectual Propertyas a Trade Issue - The Making of the

Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, WORLD
COMPETITION L. & ECON. REV., Dec. 1994, at 137 (discussing the negotiations
surrounding the TRIPS agreement and the breadth of the intellectual property rights it
protects); Frederick M. Abbott, Protecting First World Assets in the Third World:
Intellectual Property Negotiations in the GATT Multilateral Framework, 22 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 689 (1989); Friedl Weiss, TRIPS in Search of an Itinerary: Trade
Related Intellectual Property Rights and the Uruguay Round Negotiations, in
LIBERALIZATION OF SERVICES AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE URUGUAY ROUND OF

GATT 87 (Giorgio Sacerdoti ed., 1990) (comparing and contrasting the principles of
GATT and the Paris Convention).
7 See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, arts. 9-39.
8
See id. art. 2(1) (incorporating by reference the Paris Convention, supra note 6, art.
l0bis).
9 See generally Eleanor M. Fox, Trade, Competition, and Intellectual Property TRIPS and Its Antitrust Counterparts, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 481 (1996)
(recognizing the need to ensure that competition law does not undermine the obligations
of TRIPS); Hans Ullrich, TRIPS: Adequate Protection, Inadedquate Trade, Adequate
Competition Policy, in ANTITRUST: A NEW INTERNATIONAL TRADE REMEDY? 153 (John
0. Haley & Hiroshi Iyori eds., 1995) (analyzing the relationship between trade and
competition policy under TRIPS); see also Robert D. Anderson, The Interface Between
Competition Policy and Intellectual Property in the Context of the InternationalTrading
System, 1 J. INT'L ECON. L. 655 (1998).
10 See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, arts. 8(2), 40 (recognizing the need for
provisions to prevent abuse of intellectual property rights and to control anti-competitive
practices in contractual licenses, respectively).
1 See id. arts. 41-61; Thomas Dreier, TRIPs and the Enforcement of Intellectual
Property Rights, in FROM GATT TO TRIPS - THE AGREEMENT ON TRADE-RELATED
ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 248, 249-51 (ICC Studies Vol. 18,
Freidrich-Karl Beier & Gerhard Schricker eds., 1996); J.H. Reichman, Enforcing the
Enforcement Procedures of the TRIPS Agreement, 37 VA. J. INT'L L. 335, 340-44 (1997)
[hereinafter Reichman, Enforcing the Enforcement Procedures].
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compliance12 with the agreed minimum standards of intellectual property
protection.
Despite the rapid escalation of international intellectual property
protection that this scheme envisions, the TRIPS Agreement, unlike prior
GATT legislation, contains no preferential or differential measures for
developing countries. 13 After the five-year transitional period expires, all
developing countries will be held to full compliance with all the agreed
standards. However, we must continue to distinguish between developing
countries and least developed countries ("LDCs"). The poorest of the poor
have another six years in which to comply, and then there are many
loopholes for them in both the WTO Agreement and the Understandin§ on
Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes ("DSU"). So
it may be a long time before the least-developed countries are fully
integrated into the system.
This article focuses on the critical juncture in the TRIPS Agreement
that occurred on January 1, 2000, when the developing countries (but not
the LDCs) became liable for compliance with the relevant international
minimum standards. After summarizing some of the positive achievements
of the past five years, I intend to review some of the negative trends that
could become worrisome in the post-transitional period, especially if the
developed countries adopt a hardline, confrontational approach to the
coming implementation process. I then explore the virtues of a nonconfrontational (or less confrontational) approach and close with some
long-term forecasts.
I. POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE DEVELOPMENTS DURING THE TRANSITIONAL
PHASE

First of all, on the positive side, the Council for TRIPS and the WTO
secretariat that services the Council have truly been forces for mediation,

12

See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, arts. 63-64; Understanding on Rules and

Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, April 15, 1994, WTO Agreement,
supra note 2, Annex 2, 33 I.L.M. 1226 (1994) [hereinafter DSU]; Rochelle Cooper
Dreyfuss & Andreas L. Lowenfeld, Two Achievements of the Uruguay Round: Putting
TRIPS and Dispute Settlement Together, 37 VA. J. INT'LL. 275 (1997).
13 See, e.g., Abbott, supra note 6, at 731-32 (noting that transitional procedures giving
"special relief to less economically developed countries" were "not uncommon" in prior
multilateral trade arrangements).
14 See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, art. 65(2). But see id. art. 65(4) (allowing an
additional five years for developing countries to extend product patent protection to
areas of technology not previously protectible in their territories); id. art 70(8)(mail box
rule); id. art. 70(9) (exclusive marketing rights during interim period).
15 See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, art. 66; DSU, supra note 12, art. 24.
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consultation and persuasion. 16 I realize that Professor Jacques Bourgeois
has said that consultation is like an herbal tea, 17 but a lot of very good and
effective herbal tea has been drunk. On the whole, this process has avoided
needless confrontation, largely due to the effectiveness of bringing into
intellectual property law the rules of transparency that are a basic part of the
GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) jurisprudence.
A. Positive Applications of Transparency and the Appellate Standards
of Review
Article 63 of the TRIPS Agreement clearly establishes a rule of
transparency as the first step in "Dispute Prevention and Settlement."' 9 This
provision makes all countries aware of the risks of non-compliance with the
black letter rules by rendering it difficult to avoid detection of nonconforming laws. Because the Council for TRIPS has the power to invite
countries to present their laws, to discuss these laws, and to challenge them
through periodic review mechanisms and other consultative procedures, it
has successfully introduced respect for the rule of law and reduced
pressures for unilateral measures. The attitude of both the Council and the
Secretariat is, "whenever possible, to resolve differences between
countries
21
without the need for formal recourse to dispute settlement."
However, the transparency doctrine also reveals disputes that cannot
be settled by herbal tea, by consultation or mediation, and for which states
may logically turn to the dispute settlement procedures of the DSU. 22 Even
16

See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, art. 68 (charging the Council for Trade-

Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights); see also id. art. 69 (mandating
international cooperation to eliminate trade in goods that infringe intellectual property
rights); Otten, supra note 3, at 524-29.
17 Jacques Bourgeois, WTO - The Global Trade Approach, in EUROPA IM ZEITALTER
DER GLOBALISIERUNG

(Carl Baudenbacher & Erhard Busek eds., 2000), at 107.

18 See, e.g., General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. X, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat.
A-11, T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S., 194 (Publication and Administration of Trade
Regulations); JOHN H. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT 461-64 (1969).
19 See TRIPS Agreement, supranote 1, art. 63.
20

See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, arts. 63(2) (requiring members to notify laws

and regulations to Council for TRIPS), 68 (Council for Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights); Otten, supra note 3, at 525 (monitoring by Council for
TRIPS "seen as an important dispute-avoidance vehicle for resolving problems that
might otherwise become the subject of formal dispute settlement proceedings").
21 Adrian Otten & Hannu Wager, Compliance with TRIPS: The Emerging World
View, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 391, 411 (1996).
22 See generally Dreyfuss & Lowenfeld, supra note 12 (discussing hypothetical cases
necessitating resort to the dispute settlement procedures); see also Frederick M. Abbott,
WTO Dispute Settlement and the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW AND THE GATT/WTO DISPUTE
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though no analogous machinery was ever applied to the pre-existing
intellectual property conventions, the WTO process has worked
surprisingly well so far. The first Appellate Body decision, in 1997, in the
case of United States v. India,23 better known in Europe as the India
mailbox case, represents a new milestone en route to Professor John
Jackson's vision of a rule-based global trading system. 24
In its groundbreaking opinion, the Appellate Body opted for a strict
constructionist interpretation of the TRIPS Agreement, in keeping with its
view of Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.2
While there had been some doubt as to whether the Appellate Body would
in fact apply the Vienna Convention to the TRIPS Agreement, it has now
done so in a rather emphatic and strict constructionist manner.2 6 The
Appellate Body also manifested considerable deference to local law, if
good faith efforts to implement the TRIPS Agreement were being made. 7
In so doing, the Appellate Body gave three reasons why deference to
local law should become a cardinal principle of its interpretative
jurisprudence. First, Article 1(1) of the TRIPS Agreement allows states to
determine the appropriate methods of implementing its provisions within
their own legal system and practice. Second, Article 19(2) of the DSU says
that the dispute settlement process cannot add to or diminish the rights and
obligations in the covered agreements. Finally, Article 1(1) of TRIPS says
members are not obliged to implement more extensive protection than that
to which they have expressly agreed. 28 This approach, in turn, is consistent
SETTLEMENT SYSTEM 413 (Studies in Transnational Economic Law Vol. 11, Ernst-Ulrich

Petersmann ed., 1997)[hereinafter Abbott, WTO Dispute Settlement].
23 Report of the Appellate Body, India - Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and
Agricultural Chemical Products, WT/DS50/AB/R, Bernan's Annotated Rep., vol. 4, at
249 (Dec. 19, 1997) [hereinafter UnitedStates v. India].
2 See generally John H. Jackson, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND POLICY OF
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 1-30 ( 2 nd ed., 1997).

Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 31, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331, 340 (stating that a treaty will be interpreted in good faith according to the text,
object and purpose of the treaty unless otherwise established).
26 See United States v. India, supra note 23,
45 (stating that the "legitimate
expectations of the parties to a treaty are reflected in the language of the treaty itself');
see also Jerome H. Reichman, Securing Compliance With the TRIPS Agreement After
U.S. v. India, 1 J. INT'L ECON. L. 585, 594-97 (1998) [hereinafter Reichman, Securing
Compliance].
27 See United States v. India, supra note 23,
59; see also Steven P. Croley & John
H. Jackson, WTO Dispute Procedures,Standard of Review, and Deference to National
Governments, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 193 (1996) (discussing the possible standards of review
of a national government's rulings and actions under the WTO Agreements).
28 See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, art. 1(1); DSU, supra note 12, art. 19; United
25

States v. India, supra note 23,

43-48.
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with Article XX(d) of the GAT, which reserves intellectual property law
and policy to member states except as otherwise agreed.29
When, however, the Appellate Body scrutinized the facts presented in
the dispute between the United States and India, it discovered a "smoking
gun" that led it to rule against India despite the principle of deference to
national governments. The Indian government's own experts had found that
the law and administrative procedures questioned by the United States
failed to meet the relevant TRIPS standards.30
B. Resisting the Temptation to Gap-Fillthe Minimum Standards
That was enough for the Appellate Body. Yet, that Body chose to
modify the panel's own decision against India, which had been based on a
test of "competitive expectations" arising from the treaty as a whole. 3 1 This
"expectations test" was said to derive from past GATT jurisprudence and
also from a doctrine of "nonviolatory acts of nullification or impairment"
that was embedded in GATT and carried over into the TRIPS Agreement,
subject to a five-year moratorium.32 The latter doctrine holds that, even if
there is no direct violation of a GATT provision, a state may remain liable
for measures that indirectly frustrate the purposes of the treaty, such as nontariff barriers to trade.
In the TRIPS Agreement, there is a five-year moratorium on
complaints for non-violatory acts of nullification and impairment.3 3 The
Appellate Body accordingly held that a panel could not base its decision on
principles derived from the non-violatory acts provision because of that
moratorium.34
At the same time, the Appellate Body declined to apply the panel's
"expectations" test on the alternative ground that it was inconsistent with
29 See Reichman, Securing Compliance, supra note 26, at 596 (citing authorities).
30 See United States v. India, supra note 23,

80-81.

31 See Report of the Panel, India - Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and
Agricultural Chemical Products, WT/DS50/R, Bernan's Annotated Rep., vol. 4,
7.187.22, at 1, 48-49.
32 See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, art. 64(1) (incorporating by reference Articles
XXII and XXIII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994); DSU, supra note
12, arts. 3(1), 26; see also ROBERT E. HUDEC, ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW:
THE EVOLUTION OF THE MODERN GATT LEGAL SYSTEM 6-7, 144, 156-61, 269 (1993);
Frieder Roessler, The Concept of Nullification and Impairment in the Legal System of the
World Trade Organization, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW AND THE GATI/WTO

DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM, supra note 22, at 123 (discussing issues arising from and
practical effects of the concept of nullification and impairment). This provision lapsed
automatically on Dec. 31, 1999, and was not renewed at the WTO Ministerial
Conference in Seattle, Nov. 1999.
33 See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, art. 64 (2).
34 See United States v. India, supra note 23,

42.
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the strict constructionist principle that the court had derived from the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.3 5 Invoking this principle, the
Appellate Body required India to accept the foreign patent applications at
issue and to prioritize them under the "mailbox" rule of Article 70(8) of the
TRIPS Agreement; 36 but it refused to require India to process these same
applications, as the United States had demanded, because India was entitled
to the full transitional period applicable to newly patentable subject matter
in its territory.3 7
A reasonable inference from this seminal decision is that TRIPS law
consists essentially of the negotiated rules and no more. Panels cannot fill
gaps in international intellectual property law on a theory of commercial or
competitive expectations. 38 A further reasonable inference is that violations
will have to be clear, if not flagrant. The Court has specifically reminded
members that the TRIPS Agreement governs intellectual property relations
between states. Hence, the WTO is not to be treated as a court of last resort
in which private parties can bring their own disputes and vent their
displeasure with local judicial decisions.3 9 It is a forum for governments, in
which the matter at issue must have an impact on international trade.
The Appellate Body's overall approach should permit developing
countries to adapt the TRIPS standards to their own economic conditions by
exploiting4the flexibility or "wiggle room" in the international minimum
standards. 0 Two caveats deserve mention, however. First, in United States
v. India, the Appellate Body was interpreting new TRIPS rules
unencumbered by pre-existing treaties and relevant state practice. That

31 See id.
36

43-48.

See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, arts. 70(8), 70(9) (providing for exclusive

marketing rights).
37 See United States v. India, supra note 23, 58; TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1,
art. 65(4).
38 See Reichman, Securing Compliance, supra note 26, at 594-97. But see Paul
Edward Geller, Intellectual Property in the Global Marketplace: Impact of TRIPS
Dispute Settlements?, 29 INT'L LAW. 99, 109-10 (1995) (arguing for the opposite view);
Graeme B. Dinwoodie, A New Copyright Order: Why National Courts Should Create
Global Norms, 149 U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2000) (further extending the "gap
filling" principle to national courts as de facto agents of the international system).
39 See Frederick M. Abbott, The Enduring Enigma of TRIPS: A Challenge for the
World Economic System, 1 J. INT'L EcON. L. 497, 514 (1998) [hereinafter Abbott,
Enduring Enigma]. But see GAIL E. EVANS, LAW-MAKING UNDER THE TRADE
CONSTITUTION: A STUDY IN LEGISLATING BY THE WORLD TRADE ORGANISATION § 7.4.1

(forthcoming 2000) (advocating that private parties should have standing to sue before
WTO tribunals).
40 See infra note 72 and accompanying text.
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Body may or may not become bolder when applying the Paris or Berne
Conventions and their cultural baggage.4 '
Second, a lifting of the moratorium on nonviolatory complaints, which
formally expired on January 1, 2000, might conceivably loosen the
Appellate Body's interpretative process. This result seems doubtful,
however, because that tribunal took pains to link the bargained-for
expectations of member countries strictly to the standards expressed in the
text, independent of the moratorium in question. 42
C. Eroding the Free-RiderMentality
Another positive result of this whole process has been the erosion of
the free-rider mentality that predominated in the developing countries
before the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, especially in
the Newly Industrialized Countries ("NICs").4 3 These countries have moved
promptly to implement the TRIPS Agreement. They are ready and eager to
be reviewed. They want a good report card, and some of them, Taiwan, for
example, which I visited recently, are clearly beginning to realize the
benefits of a more mature intellectual property system.4
Now, this could make the NICs formidable competitors of the
developed countries with respect to high-tech and knowledge goods later
on,45 but at least such competition would transpire on a level playing field.
Meanwhile, studies suggest that compliance with TRIPS can help all
developing countries, and not just the NICs, to attract more foreign
investment and to improve the terms on which technology is likely to be
transferred.46
41 Geller and Dinwoodie would both favor such a development. Cf., e.g., Geller,
supra note 38; Dinwoodie, supra note 38.
42 See Reichman, Securing Compliance, supranote 26, at 595-96 (citing authorities).
43 See generally J.H. Reichman, Intellectual Property in International Trade:
Opportunitiesand Risks of a GATT Connection, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 747, 751-68
(1989) (presenting the debate between industrialized and developing countries about
strengthening international intellectual property protection) [hereinafter Reichman,
GATT Connection]; see also Abbott, supra note 6, at 697; Marshall A. Leaffer,
Protecting United States Intellectual Property Abroad: Toward a New Multilateralism,
76 IOWA L. REv. 273 (1991).
44 Cf. Carlos A. Primo Braga & Carsten Fink, Reforming Intellectual Property Rights
Regimes: Challengesfor Developing Countries, 1 J. INT'L ECON. L. 537, 538-41 (1998)
(recognizing the growing importance of IPRs in developing countries).
45 See, e.g., HAMBURG INSTITUTE FOR ECONOMIC RESEARCH ET AL., CONFLICT AND
COOPERATION IN NATIONAL COMPETITION

FOR HIGH-TECHNOLOGY

INDUSTRY

19-24

(1996)[hereinafter COMPETITION FOR HIGH TECHNOLOGY INDUSTRY].

46 See, e.g., Keith E. Maskus, The Role of Intellectual Property Rights in
Encouraging Foreign Direct Investment and Technology Transfer, 9 DUKE J. COMP. &
INT'L L. 109, 175-81 (1998); Carlos A. Primo Braga & Carsten Fink, The Relationship
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D. Negative Factorson the Horizon
Let me now identify some of the more ominous negative factors that
should also be placed on the table. If we disregard the APEC countries,
which are reportedly on schedule to meet the deadline,47 the bulk of the
developing countries appear behind schedule in implementing the TRIPS
Agreement. 48 Many will not be ready by January 1, 2000, and they are in an
increasingly angry and resentful frame of mind.
1. Transaction Costs Unlimited
The transaction costs of building and staffing intellectual property
systems, including patent offices and other administrative agencies,
constitute a palpable drain on very scarce resources.49 Poor countries also
have to send high-level delegations to numerous meetings at the World
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), the WTO, and other bodies, not
to mention regional and sub-regional meetings on related issues, whose
costs further burden their treasuries. It is an open secret that many countries
could simply not afford to attend these meetings if WIPO or other
organizations did not foot all or part of the bills.
The developing countries have also become increasingly conscious of
the social costs that their TRIPS obligations will entail in the short and
medium terms.5 0 There are, in particular, certain hot-button issues that have
fanned resentment. At the top of the list, perhaps, is the problem of
acquiring essential medicines at affordable prices. I personally do not see
Between Intellectual Property Rights and ForeignDirectInvestment, 9 DUKE J. COMP. &
INT'L. L. 163 (1998).
47 Shigeo Takakura, The Role of APEC and the JPO in the Field of Intellectual
Property Rights, Speech at the 1999 High Technology Protection Summit (July 24, 1999)
(transcript available at the Center for Advanced Study and Research on Intellectual
Property, University of Washington School of Law).
48 See, e.g., Otten, supra note 3, at 529-3 1.
49 See, e.g., Ruth L. Gana, Prospectsfor Developing Countries Under the TRIPS
Agreement, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 735, 770 (1996); Primo Braga & Fink, supra
note 44, at 549-50.
50 See, e.g., U.N. Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), The TRIPS
Agreement and Developing Countries, at 15-20, U.N. Doc. 96/II/D/10 (1996)
[hereinafter UNCTAD, TRIPS]; see also Ruth Gana Okediji, Copyright and Public
Welfare in Global Perspective, 7 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 117, 172-89 (1999).
51 See, e.g., Jayashree Watal, TRIPS and the 1999 WTO Millennium Round: Some
Reflections on Future Issues Related to IPRs in the WTO and the Way Forwardfor
Developing Countries, 3 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 3, 7-24 (2000); Globalization and
Access to Drugs: Perspectives on the WTO/ITRIPS Agreement, World Health
Organization, DAP Series No. 7, WHO/DAP/98.9 Rev. (1999), available at World
Health Organization (visited May 26, 2000) <http://wholibdoc.who.int/hq/1998/WHO
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this as an insoluble problem, but the big pharmaceutical companies and
their government patrons had been taking a hard line at the time of
writing.5 2
Problems of maintaining biodiversity and sharing in the gains from
exploiting local plants and medicines, as well as from traditional knowhow, have likewise attracted considerable attention.53 There are also ethical
and emotional issues, such as questions concerning the patenting of life
forms. Efforts of hybrid seed manufacturers to prevent farmers from using
seeds of improved crop varieties without having to repurchase them is
another hot-button issue at the moment.54
2. Uneven Distribution of Benefits
There is also a growing perception that the benefits of higher
intellectual property protection may be very unevenly distributed, at least in
the short and medium terms, even though all the developing countries must
bear the transaction costs mentioned above. 55 Numerous small countries in
Latin America, for example, find themselves significantly disadvantaged in
this respect, unlike two or three of the region's larger economic powers that
have virtually attained the status of Newly Industrialized Countries. How
smaller or less advanced countries can limit these disadvantages and their

DAP_98.9_Revised.pdf>; CARLOS M. CORREA, INTEGRATING PUBLIC HEALTH CONCERNS
INTO PATENT LEGISLATION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (forthcoming).
52 See, e.g., Watal, supranote 51, at 17-22.
53 See, e.g., Thomas Cottier, The Protection of Genetic Resources and Traditional
Knowledge: Towards More Specific Rights and Obligations in World Trade Law, 1 J.
INT'L ECON. L. 555, 557-84 (1998); Rosemary J. Coombe, Intellectual Property,Human
Rights & Sovereignty: New Dilemmas in InternationalLaw Posed by the Recognition of
Indigenous Knowledge and the Conservation of Biodiversity, 6 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL
STUD. 59 (1998); see also Margaret Llewelyn, Patenting or Plant Variety Protection?,
Paper Presented to the World Trade Forum 1999, Berne, Switz. (Aug. 27-28, 1999); Anil
Gupta, Securing Traditional Knowledge and Grassroot Innovation: What Role for the
Global Trading System?, Paper Presented to the World Trade Forum 1999, Berne, Switz.
(Aug. 27-28, 1999).
54 See, e.g., Cottier, supranote 53, at 561-84; Watal, supra note 51, at 9-10, 17-22.
55 See UNCTAD, TRIPS, supra note 50, at 15-20; see also Samuel A. Oddi, TRIPS Natural Rights and a "Polite Form of Economic Imperialism," 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L

L. 415, 455-60 (1996); Carlos A. Primo Braga, Trade-Related Intellectual Property
Issues: The UruguayRound Agreement and its Economic Implications, in THE URUGUAY
ROUND AND DEVELOPING ECONOMIES 341 (World Bank Discussion papers No. 307, Will
Martin & L. Alan Winters eds., 1996).
56 Cf. Keith E. Maskus, Intellectual Property Rights and Economic Development, 32
CASE W. RES. J. INT'LL. 471.
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attendant social costs during a foreseeably long
technological "catch-up"
57
period is perceived as a major strategic issue.
At the same time, proposals for new forms of intellectual property
protection that might generate income streams for developing countries at
the expense of public domain users in developed countries have, until
recently at least, received a cool reception at the international level.
Resistance to proposals that would protect folklore and native arts under
rights related to copyright law, 58 for example, is often couched in terms of
avoiding unacceptable deviations from Western legal traditions and
doctrinal orthodoxy. Such purist foot-dragging infuriates the representatives
of the poorer countries, who are well aware that the developed countries
recently turned orthodox copyright principles on their head in order to
accommodate their own manufacturers of computer programs.5 9
3. A "Pound of Flesh" Mentality
Meanwhile, the various intellectual property owners' associations in
developed countries are clearly gearing up for a fight, as are their respective
trade representatives. Having failed to accelerate the implementation of
TRIPS during the transitional period, these associations now want full
compliance after January 1, 2000. They are helping governments to prepare
the necessary country by country reviews. This, in turn, has bred
considerable anxiety among the developing countries as they contemplate
the order in which they will be called before the Council for TRIPS,60 not to
mention the impending bilateral requests for consultations with their
implicit threat of formal litigation in the end.
In this connection, the intellectual property owners who most dominate
the process are pressing maximalist claims and interpretations of TRIPS
standards that are consistent with their earlier negotiating positions, but are

57
58

Cf. Abbott, Enduring Enigma, supra note 39, at 502-10.
See, e.g., Kamal Puri, Preservationand Conservation of Expressions of Folklore,

Oct.-Dec. 1998, at 5; Folarin Shyllon, Conservation, Preservation,
and the Legal Protection of Folklore in Africa: A General Survey, COPYRIGHT BULL.,
Oct.-Dec. 1998, at 37; Rachel Massey & Christopher Stephens, Intellectual Property
Rights, the Law, and Indigenous Peoples' Art, COPYRIGHT BULL., Oct.-Dec. 1998, at 49;
see also ROSEMARY J. COOMBE, THE CULTURAL LIFE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTIES:
AUTHORSHIP, APPROPRIATION, AND THE LAW 208-47 (1998).
59 See, e.g., TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, art. 10(2) (requiring computer programs
to "be protected as literary works under the Berne Convention (1971)"). See generally
Pamela Samuelson, Randall Davis, Mitchell D. Kapur & J.H. Reichman, A Manifesto
Concerning the Legal Protection of Computer Programs, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 2308,
2315-65 (1994) [hereinafter Samuelson et al., Manifesto].
60 See, e.g., Otten, supra note 3, at 524-30 (discussing monitoring and dispute
COPYRIGHT BULL.,

settlement issues under TRIPS).
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often inconsistent with the black letter rules of the various disciplines.61
Moreover, powerful firms and trade associations seem determined to press
certain scope of protection issues on which there is often no consensus,
even in the developed countries. 62 Attempts to bully the international

organizations that advise the developing countries on these issues are
frequently encountered; and even organized efforts to provide technical
cooperation under Article 67 of the TRIPS Agreemente6 have sometimes
reportedly degenerated into crude propaganda exercises that give exclusive
voice to the views of the high protectionist coalition.
The TRIPS Agreement itself calls for review of certain borderline
issues that were not fully resolved in 1994 and that are extremely
controversial. 64 Prime examples are the patenting of biogenetically
engineered products and processes and the protection of plant varieties in
the domestic intellectual property laws, both of which must be reviewed
after January 1, 2000.65 Because the European Union has finally adopted a
Directive on the legal protection of biotechnology, 66 which had been
unattainable in the early 1990s, their negotiators may press the developing
67

countries for higher levels of intellectual property protection in this field.

g

Yet, these issues will hardly prove less controversial in the developing
countries than they were in the European Union. Moreover, any intellectual
property regime governing biotechnology will affect developing countries

in different ways, depending on the state of their existing technological

61 See,

e.g., Watal, supra note 51, at 4-5 (contrasting views of research-based

pharmaceutical companies with those of consumer activist groups and NGOs also in
developed countries); Harvey E. Bale, Jr., The Conflicts Between Parallel Trade and
ProductAccess and Innovation: The Case of Pharmaceuticals,1. J. INT'L ECON. L. 637,
650-51 (1998); Eric H. Smith, Worldwide Copyright Protection Under the TRIPS
Agreement, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 559, 573-78 (1996); see also Graeme B.
Dinwoodie, The Integration of International and Domestic Intellectual Property
Lawmaking, 23 COLUM. VLA J. L & THE ARTS 63 (2000).
62 Cf. Dreyfuss & Lowenfeld, supra note 12.
63 See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, art. 67 (mandating technical cooperation on
behalf of both developing and least developed countries); Watal, supra note 51, at 27-28.
64 See, e.g., Otten, supra note 3, at 531-33 (discussing the "built-in agenda" of
TRIPS).
65 See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, art. 27(3)(b).
66 See Directive 98/44 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Legal
Protection of Biotechnological Inventions, July 6, 1998, 1998 O.J. (L 213) 13.
67 But see Watal, supra note 51, at 9-10 (noting more cautious views among both
business and governments about reopening the debate concerning article 27.3(b) of
TRIPS during preparatory period for Ministerial Meeting in late 1999).
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infrastructures, 68 and it may prove objectively difficult for them to
formulate a coherent policy with which to resist demands for prematurely

high levels of protection.
Meanwhile, the United States continues to threaten the rest of the
world with Section 301 actions, even though the DSU, in Article 23,
appears to outlaw resort to unilateral actions as the price of the package
deal underlying the Uruguay Round. 69 The European Union has, in fact,
challenged some aspects of the United States resort to Section 301 in a
formal WTO dispute settlement action.70 Whether the WTO (or the U.S.
Congress and Administration) are prepared to deal with the aftershocks of
conflicts of this magnitude remains to be seen.

4. New Demands for Ever Higher Levels of Protection
At the time of writing, the United States, the European Union, and
Japan had drawn up a list of new topics, including new demands for higher
intellectual property protection, to become the basis for a Millennium
Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations. Especially ominous was the
inclination to allow the moratorium on non-violatory complaints of
nullification and impairment under Article 64 to lapse. 71 This move would
further encourage powerful coalitions of intellectual property owners to
press for maximalist interpretation of existing norms, including their own
views of the gray
areas, the "wiggle room" areas, on which there is much
2
disagreement.
68 See Joshua V. Funder, Rethinking Patentsfor Plant Innovation, 21 EUR. INTELL.

PROP. REV. 551, 566-77 (1999); Llewelyn, supra note 53; Reichman, From Free Riders
to FairFollowers, supra note 4, at 36-39 (citing authorities).
69 See DSU, supra note 12, art. 23 (strengthening of the multilateral system); WTO
Agreement, supra note 2, art. XV(4) (requiring members to conform their laws to the
obligations of all the Uruguay Round Agreements); see also Reichman, Securing
Compliance, supra note 26, at 598-99.
70 See Report of the Panel, United States - Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of
1974, WT/DS 152/R (Dec. 22, 1999), available at World Trade Organization (visited
May 26, 2000) <http://www.wto.orglwto/disputelwtdsl52r.pdf> (warning against
violations, but accepting U.S. administrative undertakings to avoid inconsistencies
between Section 301 actions and DSU proceedings).
71 See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, art. 64(2)-(3). Technically, the moratorium
automatically expired on January 1, 2000 (a consensus of the Member States could not
agree to suspend application of the existing provision on the recommendation of the
Council for TRIPS).
72 See, e.g., Watal, supra note 51, at 8-9 (fearing "activist" interpretations of TRIPS
norms by panels and other WTO bodies under cover of "nonviolatory acts"); Dreyfuss &
Lowenfeld, supra note 12, at 283-97 (exploring difficulties of non-violation complaints
in the context of the TRIPS Agreement). See generally Reichman, From Free Riders to
Fair Followers, supra note 4, at 27-51 (identifying gaps in the TRIPS standards that
provide developing countries with flexible compliance options).
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Those who favor lifting the ban on nonviolatory complaints
underestimate the extent to which this doctrine, once set loose in the fluid
world of intellectual property rights, could boomerang against developed
countries, especially those wedded to a common law approach, such as the
United States. It could, indeed, expose many federal appellate decisions
affecting foreign intellectual property rights holders to second guessing
actions filed before the WTO in Geneva. Should the WTO panels or the
Appellate Body become receptive to complaints of this kind, it could
hamper the ability of the U.S. authorities to formulate domestic intellectual
property policy over time.
The availability of nonviolatory complaints would also magnify
existing temptations to wring unnegotiated benefits out of the disputeresolution process rather than seeking to resolve pending intellectual
property issues by offering to exchange greater market access for higher
levels of protection. Such a strategy would further elevate tensions and put
more pressure on the fledgling dispute-settlement apparatus than it is yet
ready to bear. To their credit, some developed country negotiators appear
less keen than others about lifting the moratorium on nonviolatory acts, and
Professor Jackson has questioned the wisdom of continuing to rely on this
doctrine at all, now that states have begun systematically to negotiate the
removal of non-tariff barriers.73
Meanwhile, authorities in the United States and the European Union
seem relatively unconcerned about either the ability of the developing
countries to defray the costs of still higher levels of intellectual property
protection or the unwillingness of U.S. political circles to endure the
countervailing costs of new trade concessions to be given in exchange. 74
Perhaps the protests at the Ministerial Meeting in Seattle will have kindled
second thoughts in this regard.
When questioned publicly about new concessions for developing
countries, high-level spokespersons for the U.S. Administration and the
European Commission have, in the recent past, tended to duck the issue by
feigning a reluctance to reveal their hand.75 Prior to the Uruguay Round,
however, the developed countries did reveal their hand. From the
beginning, everybody knew that developing countries were going to gain
73 Cf. John H. Jackson, Fragmentation or Unification Among International
Institutions: The World Trade Organization, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 823 (1999).
However, no action was taken to renew the moratorium, which expired at the end of

1999.
74 See, e.g., Sir Leon Brittan, The Contribution of the WTO Millennium Round to
Globalisation:An EU View, in EUROPA IM ZEITALTER DER GLOBALISIERUNG, supra note
18, at 81; Richard Self, The Contribution of the WTO Millennium Round to
Globalization: The U.S. View, in EUROPA IMZEITALTER DER GLOBALISIERUNG, supra note
17, at 77; see also Bourgeois, supra note 17.
75 See, e.g., Brittan, supra note 74; Self, supra note 74.
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concessions in agriculture and textiles and that developed countries were
going to obtain stronger intellectual property rights, and that is what
happened.76
One reason that the authorities have not wanted to reveal their hand is
that they may hold no cards. President Clinton did not obtain fast-track
authority, and Congressional actions continually belie the rhetoric of free
trade. Nevertheless, the big multinational firms with greatest access to
USTR keep on pressing for ever higher levels of intellectual property
protection, regardless of the costs, and few have bothered to ask the small
and medium-sized firms that actually drive the U.S. economy whether they
would benefit or suffer from such proposals.
Another reason that we do not hear much about new trade concessions
for developing countries is that some of the developed countries'
negotiators may view debt forgiveness as a trump card in any future round
of multilateral trade negotiations. While debt forgiveness is long overdue, a
strategy of wringing untenable levels of intellectual property protection that
mortgaged the technological future of poor countries out of weak
governments could discredit the entire enterprise.
This theme leads directly into my next topic. The question becomes
how to confront this sobering list of negative factors on the TRIPS horizon
without straining the new institutional infrastructure built around the WTO
to the breaking point.
II. CONFRONTATION OR COOPERATION IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM?

The negative trends summarized above should focus attention on the
kind of process that would yield the greatest benefits after January 1, 2000,
when the developing countries became fully liable for breaches of their
international obligations under the TRIPS standards. Shall it be a process of
confrontation or cooperation? Some of us believe that a more cooperative
approach would lead to greater gains while lessening the risks to the
survival of the WTO system as a whole.77
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See, e.g., Will Martin & L. Alan Winters, The Uruguay Round: A Milestonefor the

Developing Countries, in THE URUGUAY ROUND AND THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, supra

note 55, at 1, 1-14.
77 See, e.g., Martine de Koning, Why the Coercion-BasedGATT Approach is Not the
Only Answer to Piracy in the Asia-PacificRegion, 19 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 59 (1997)
(examining how a cooperative approach could function in the Asia-Pacific region); J.H.
Reichman & David Lange, Bargaining Around the TRIPS Agreement: The Case for
Ongoing Public-Private Initiatives to Facilitate Worldwide Intellectual Property
Transactions, 9 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 11 (1998); see also Rochelle Cooper
Dreyfuss, Comment, Coming of Age With TRIPS: A Comment on J.H. Reichman, The
TRIPS Agreement Comes of Age: Conflict or Cooperation in the Post-Transitional
Phase?, 33 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. (forthcoming).
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A. Why a ConfrontationalApproach Seems Likely to Fail
While the TRIPS Agreement harmonizes the domestic intellectual
property regimes to an unprecedented degree, there is a tendency to forget
that the end result is a long way from a set of uniform laws. If the greatest
gains occurred in patent law, for example, this was largely because
international patent protection under the Paris Convention had remained
abysmally weak, despite concerted and ultimately unsuccessful efforts to
revise the Paris Convention between 1979 and 1985.78
1. Gaps in the Law
My own assessment is that the TRIPS Agreement left the intellectual
property glass either half full or half empty, depending on one's point of
view. TRIPS was largely a backwards-looking agreement that relied on
time-honored doctrinal norms that seemed well-suited to the creative
productions of the Industrial Revolution. However, it did not seriously
address the problems caused by the newer technologies, especially
information technologies, which fit imperfectly within the classical patent
and copyright paradigms; 79 and it did not begin to address the broad areas
of traditional intellectual property law in which state practice in developed
countries varies widely.
There is still no consensus concerning such basic patent issues as the
subject matter of protection (computer programs and biotechnology remain
unsettled, for example); the novelty and nonobviousness standards of
eligibility; the scope of the exclusive rights (including the doctrine of
equivalents); or the exceptions that all states should be allowed to make. 0
Even in copyright law, where the Berne Convention represented a much
higher degree of systemic harmonization than was true under the Paris
Convention, no consensus has been reached with respect to fundamental
78

See, e.g., Reichman, GATT Connection, supra note 43, at 751-68 (discussing

contrasting views of developed and developing countries during failed efforts in WIPO
to revise the Paris Convention in the period 1979-1985); see also Evans, supra note 6, at
146-48.
79 See, e.g., Charles R. McManis, Taking TRIPS on the Information Superhighway:
InternationalIntellectual Property Protection and Emerging Computer Technology, 41
VILL. L. REv. 207, 232-86 (1996); International Association for the Advancement of
Teaching and Research in Intellectual Property, Emergent Technologies and Intellectual
Property: Multimedia, Biotechnology and Other Issues 13-56 (Kraig M. Hill & Laraine
Morse eds., 1996); Abbott, Enduring Enigma, supra note 39, at 514-16; Cottier, supra
note 53. See generally J.H. Reichman, Legal Hybrids Between the Patent and Copyright
Paradigms, 94 COLUM. L. RE'V. 2432, 2483-88 (1994); J.H. Reichman, Charting the
Collapse of the Patent-CopyrightDichotomy: Premisesfor a Restructured International
Intellectual PropertySystem, 13 CARDOzO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 475 (1995).
80 See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, arts. 27-34; Reichman, From Free Riders to
FairFollowers,supranote 4, at 27-42.

CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.

[Vol 32:441

scope of protection issues, or to the kinds of exceptions and limitations that
states may freely implement. 81 However, some progress with respect to
basic norms governing transmissions of literary and artistic works in
cyberspace was made at a WIPO Diplomatic Conference in December
1996,87 and proposals to integrate these norms into the TRIPS Agreement
may logically appear on the agenda for a future round.83
Against this backdrop, hard-nosed confrontational strategies for
implementing the TRIPS standards risk backfiring by revealing the full
extent of the residual disagreement, as reflected in conflicting state
practices. Undue pressure may also convince governments in the
developing countries to resist further harmonization at all costs.
2. Defensive Measures
If the developing countries do decide to stiffen their resistance, they
can formulate regional positions on key intellectual property issues, which,
as instances of state practice, could greatly influence the future
development of international intellectual property law and policy.8 4 Indeed,
something of this sort is already underway in the APEC framework. While
these countries are determined to meet the deadline for compliance with the
basic TRIPS standards, they see themselves as the one region that most
acutely needs to reconcile the intellectual property strategies of highly
developed countries with those likely to benefit poorer developing
countries. 85 APEC thus seems determined to forge its own policies and
standards for the post-transitional phase, and their example could influence
other regions and subregions.

81

See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, arts. 9-14; Kenneth D. Crews, Harmonization

and the Goals of Copyright: Property Rights or Cultural Progress?, 6 IND. J. GLOBAL
LEGAL STUD. 117, 132-38 (1998); Pamela Samuelson, Challenges for the World
Intellectual Property Organization and the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights Council in Regulating Intellectual Property Right in the Information
Age, 21 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 578 (1999); Okediji, supra note 50, at 157-72; see also
Reichman, From Free Riders to FairFollowers, supra note 4, at 42-51.
82 See World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, S.
Treaty Doc. No. 105-17, 36 I.L.M. 65; World Intellectual Property Organization
Performances and Phonograms Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, S. Treaty Doc. No. 105-17, 36
I.L.M. 76; Agreed Statements Concerning the WIPO Copyright Treaty, adopted Dec. 20,
1996, WIPO doc. CRNR/DC/96; see also Pamela Samuelson, The U.S. DigitalAgenda at
WIPO, 37 UVA. J. INT'L. L. 369 (1997).
83 See, e.g., Neil W. Netanel, The Next Round: The Impact of the WIPO Copyright
Treaty on TRIPS Dispute Settlement, 37 VA. J. INT'L L. 441, 441-43 (1997).
84 See Abbott, WTO Dispute Settlement, supra note 22, at 418-27 (discussing
application of Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties to TRIPS disputes).
85 See, e.g., Takakura, supra note 47.
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Besides exploiting the flexibility or "wiggle room" that pervades
existing international minimum standards of intellectual property
protection, the developing countries retain broad powers to tax and
otherwise regulate intellectual property owners in ways that could
significantly undermine their commercial expectations.86 There is even
more room for states to use competition law to limit the social costs of
higher standards of intellectual property protection. 87 This risk seems likely
to trigger serious initiatives to bring competition law within the WTO
disciplines, despite the lack of consensus surrounding all but the most basic
norms even in the developed countries.8 8
Of course, incautious use of such regulatory powers becomes a doubleedged sword, which could discourage direct foreign investment and
transfers of technology, undermine local innovation, and lessen overall
economic efficiency. 8 Nevertheless, they are logical responses to excessive
or premature demands by intellectual property owners who focus only on
their own short-term interests. Governments in developing countries that
find it politically expedient to respond to the social discontent of
intellectual property users may seek to gain time by relying on these
regulatory measures, without sufficiently evaluating their costs; and they
may also come to assess the relevant policy variables from their own unique
perspective, just as the United States did when it was still a developing
country.90
3. Litigating to Impasse
Conflict and confrontation in the post-transitional phase could soon
cripple the mediatory powers of the Council for TRIPS 91 and lead to
86

See generally Oddi, supra note 55, at 461-69 (discussing strategies to mitigate the

initial economic costs of TRIPS).
87 See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, arts. 8(2), 40; Fox, supra note 9; Spencer
Weber Waller, The Internationalizationof Antitrust Enforcement, 77 B.U. L. REV. 343,

349-60 (1997) (discussing the failure of international harmonization efforts and the
success of regional efforts).
s8 See generally Fox, supra note 9 (discussing the relationship between TRIPS and
competition law); Ullrich, supra note 9; Waller, supra note 87, at 349-52; see also
Bourgeois, supra note 17; Alexander Schaub, Fusionskontrolle in der Globalen
Wirtschaft [Merger Control in the Globalized Economy], in EUROPA IM ZEIrALTER DER
GLOBALISIERUNG, supra note 17, at 129; Eleanor Fox, Global Governance: Towards a
Multi-Dimensional One-World, in EUROPA IM ZEITALTER DER GLOBALISIERUNG, supra
note 17, at 140.
89 See Reichman, From Free Riders to FairFollowers, supra note 4, at 52-58 (citing
authorities that illustrate the double-edged sword effect).
90 See, e.g., Fox, supra note 9, at 490 (discussing the swing in the U.S. position over
the last quarter-century).
91 See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, art. 68.
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wholesale litigation. Seasoned observers already expect the number of
dispute settlement actions to increase exponentially once the developing
countries lose their immunities, and the coalition of intellectual property
owners can hardly wait to bring test cases. The successes of the transitional
phase thus appear to have bred unrealistic expectations founded on
unwarranted faith in a system that had yet to face the most potentially
disruptive issues, at least until
93 the vocal expressions of discontent voiced
at Seattle in November 1999.
I predict that no one will be satisfied with the results of an excessively
litigious strategy, and that the coalition of intellectual property owners may
find their potential leverage much diminished in the end if they pursue it.
The Appellate Body will not be maneuvered into affording rights holders
more than their governments bargained for in the Uruguay Round.94 The
hard truth is that these same governments compromised far more, and
obtained far less, than the various trade associations can afford to admit.
For example, spokespersons for the big pharmaceutical interests have
claimed that public interest compulsory licenses facilitating access to
patented, essential medicines are illegal; that requiring the local working of
patented inventions is no longer permitted; and that the patentee's exclusive
right to import patented products trumps a state's right to allow competing
imports under the doctrine of international exhaustion.95 Instead, I believe
that, were the Appellate Body forced to decide these issues, it would uphold
the validity of virtually all public-interest compulsory licenses, so long as
the governments concerned observed the conditions set out in Article 31 ;96
it would find that local working requirements to correct abuse remain
protected by the Paris Convention and that "abuse" is very broadly
defined; 97 and it would decline to limit resort to international exhaustion on
92

Cf Judith H. Bello, Some Practical Observations About WTO Settlement of

Intellectual PropertyDisputes, 37 VA. J. INT'L L. 357, 364-67 (1997).
93 For the view that developed countries are now less eager to press for higher levels
of international intellectual property protection owing, in part, to fears of "an emerging
coalition between powerful lobbies in developed countries and governments of
developing countries," see Watal, supra note 51, at 4-5.
94 See, e.g., Dreyfuss & Lowenfeld, supra note 12, at 316-24 ("The Appellate
Process"); Reichman, Securing Compliance, supra note 26, at 594-97 (discussing the
India Mail Box case).
95 See, e.g., Bale, supra note 61, at 649-51; Watal, supra note 51, at 17-21, 26; see
also Joseph Straus, Implications of the TRIPs Agreement in the Field of Patent Law, in
FROM GATr TO TRIPS, supra note 11, at 160.
96 See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, art. 31; Reichman, Universal Minimum
Standards, supra note 2, at 34-36.
97 See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, art. 2(1); Paris Convention, supra note 5, art.
5A; G.H.C. BODENHAUSEN, GUIDE TO THE APPLICATION OF THE PARIS CONVENTION FOR
THE PROTECTION OF INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY, As REVISED AT STOCKHOLM IN 1967, at 67,
70-71 (1968).
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TRIPS Agreement makes the issue nonthe grounds that Article 6 of the
98
justiciable before WTO panels.
Moreover, putting too much pressure too soon on the developing
countries could induce them to push back by invoking safeguards codified
in Articles 7 and 8,99 whose potential impact is fortified by the preambular
objectives. 00 Experts in developing countries now perceive Articles 7 and
8(1) as a basis for seeking waivers to meet unforeseen conditions of
hardship.' 0'
These countries could attempt to trigger the safeguards implicit in
Articles 7 and 8 in one of two ways. The least destructive approach would
be to convince the Council for TRIPS itself to recommend narrowly
described waivers to meet specified circumstances for a limited period of
time. 0 2 This approach would strengthen the mediatory powers of the
Council for TRIPS and help to offset the problems arising from the inability
of that body to quash or stay requests for consultations
and dispute03
settlement panels launched by trigger-happy governments.1
Alternatively, developing country defendants responding to complaints
of nullification and impairment under Article 64 04 might invoke the
application of Articles 7 and 8(1) to meet unforeseen conditions of
hardship. This defense, if properly grounded and supported by factual
evidence, could persuade the Appellate Body either to admit the existence
of a tacit doctrine of frustration built into the aforementioned articles or to
buttress those articles by reaching out to the general doctrine of frustration
98 See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, art. 6; Frederick M. Abbott, First Report
(Final) to the Committee on International Trade Law of the International Law
Association on the Subject of ParallelImportation, 1 J. INT'L ECON. L. 607 (1998). But
see Bale, supra note 61, at 637-54.
99 See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, arts. 7-8.
100 See id. Preamble. Among other things, these recitals stress the need "to ensure that
measures and procedures to enforce intellectual property rights do not themselves
become barriers to legitimate trade." Id. They also stress that effective means of
enforcement must "tak[e] into account differences in national legal systems"; that the
"transitional arrangements [should aim] at the fullest participation in the results of the
negotiations"; and that "intellectual property rights are private rights" that must be
reconciled with, or balanced against "the underlying public policy objectives of national
systems for the protection of intellectual property, including developmental and
technological objectives." Id.
101 See, e.g., CORREA, supra note 51.
102 Technically, a waiver requires a three-fourths vote of the Ministerial Conference in
"exceptional circumstances" after a recommendation from the Council for TRIPS. See

WTO Agreement, supra note 1, art. IX.
103 See Dreyfuss & Lowenfeld, supra note 12, at 310-16 (criticizing this perceived
lacuna).
104 See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, art. 64.

CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.

[Vol 32:441

recognized in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 105 Either way,
overly aggressive complainants could wind up with what would amount to
a judicially imposed waiver.
Recall, moreover, that the legal product available to most citizens of
most developing countries is poor by Western standards, in part because the
legal and judicial system in a poor country is likely to suffer from the same
lack of capital as other areas. Article 41(5) of TRIPS says that member
countries are under no obligation to provide foreign intellectual property
owners with a better legal product than is available to nationals even if the
TRIPS procedures set out in Articles 41-61 must be implemented. 10 6 A
confrontational atmosphere will thus decrease the developing countries'
incentives to enforce intellectual property laws07 protecting foreigners in
subtle ways that will seldom become actionable.'
Let me reiterate that ending the moratorium on nonviolatory
complaints in a climate of confrontation and hostility could thoroughly
destabilize the WTO. Consider, for example, that under a common law
process of legal evolution, the U.S. federal appellate courts have slowly
developed case law limiting copyright protection of software and opening
patent protection of software.10 If this process had been disrupted by suits
filed in Geneva by government attorneys acting on behalf of disgruntled
foreign litigants, the loss of sovereign control over intellectual property law
and policy might have appalled Congress. Yet, that is the kind of risk all
countries face in a climate of conflict and unbridled litigation once nonviolatory complaints are allowed. 0 9
Summing all these risks together, I conclude that an overly litigious
climate that produced a stream of controversial decisions on the limits of
intellectual property protection would convince most states that they had
lost too much sovereignty in this area, and it would undermine confidence

105 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 25, arts. 61(1), 62.
106

See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, arts. 41(5), 42-61; Reichman, Enforcing the

Enforcement Procedures,supra note 11, at 340-41.
107 Cf. MICHAEL P. RYAN, KNOWLEDGE DIPLOMACY:
POLITICS

OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

GLOBAL COMPETITION AND THE

156-58 (1998)

(predicting difficulties

in

implementing both intellectual property laws and judicial reforms in developing
countries).
108 See, e.g., J.H. Reichman, The Know-How Gap in the TRIPS Agreement: Why
Software Fared Badly, and What are the Solutions, 17 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J.
763, 767-68 (1995). See generally Samuelson et al., Manifesto, supra note 59, at 2332-64
(arguing that existing regimes do not adequately protect the industrial compilations of
applied technical know-how embodied in computer programs).
109 For detailed examples of this risk, see Dreyfuss & Lowenfeld, supra note 12, at
282-97.
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in and loyalty to the WTO process.110 If the United States lost too many
cases, a Congress that had declined to pay its dues to the United Nations
and that had withdrawn from the United Nations Educational, Scientific,
and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), could reconsider its commitment to
the WTO.
Conversely, if the United States and European Union won too many
cases, the resentment of developing countries could spill over to other, nonnegotiated areas. It does not take much practical wisdom or experience to
see how easy it is for a truly determined group of countries spanning three
continents to find ways to put spikes in the wheels of a weak and
decentralized international system.
B. Bargaining Around the TRIPS Agreement: Elements of a More
CooperativeApproach
In contrast to a confrontational approach, I urge consideration of a
more cooperative approach to the post-transitional phase, an approach that
Professor David Lange and I have termed "bargaining around the TRIPS
Agreement." ' Under this approach, governments would treat the TRIPS
Agreement as a basic set of default rules that they bargained around, with a
view to obtaining win-win positions for all the players.
Such a process is, of course, perfectly consistent with the philosophy
underlying prior development of the GATT. From this perspective, it is
useful to distinguish government to government actions from public-private
initiatives.
1.

Government to Government Undertakings

Looking at government to government transactions, the first goal, in
my view, is to consolidate the transparency and mediatory functions of the
Council for TRIPS as an effective alternative to litigation.112 In particular,
we need to consolidate the anti-copying, anti-counterfeiting and antifreeriding thrust of TRIPS on which everyone agrees. This entails the
notion that governments should reserve dispute-settlement actions for slamdunk decisions, like that in the United States v. India case, but that they
should not bring such actions to test the gray, unbargained for areas. They
should, moreover, avoid recourse to non-violatory complaints and leave the
gray, or "wiggle room," areas to WIPO, where market power is less of a
110

Cf., e.g., COMPETrION FOR HIGH-TECHNOLOGY INDUSTRY, supra note

45, at 91-94

(stressing costs of enforcement and calling for "a cooperative effort ...
to adjust existing
intellectual property rules to the needs of new fields such as global information systems
and biotechnology. Multilateral efforts to address these issues constructively should be
encouraged.").
1 See Reichman & Lange, supra note 77, at 49-65.
112 Cf. Otten, supranote 3, at 524-29.
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factor and where methodical negotiations and deliberations can take place
at a high technical level and with inputs from regional caucuses.
With the Cold War ended, the climate for negotiations within the
WIPO framework has changed for the better. This is attested by the
successful outcome of the 1996 Diplomatic Conference that produced two
fundamental treaties governing international copyright relations in the
networked environment.' 1 3 Since 1998, WIPO's procedures have been
further streamlined, with a view to facilitating direct inputs by Regional
Groups on pending issues before Standing Committees, with fewer overlays
of so-called Groups of Experts that were prone to manipulation in the past.
Moreover, WIPO's legislative process has been made more open by
the recent practice of allowing both intergovernmental
and
nongovernmental representatives to take the floor during deliberations of
the Standing Committees. The WTPO process has, of course, also benefited
from the success of the TRIPS Agreement itself, which gives all countries a
stake in the international intellectual property system and obliges them to
seek a balance
1 14 of interests that both developed and developing countries
can accept.
In the new WIPO framework, experience demonstrates that the United
States and the European Union cannot dictate to the rest of the world and
still hope to come away with positive legislative results. Despite much
huffing and puffing, for example, real progress on WIPO Treaties I and II
of 1996 could not be made until the United States and European Union
delegations persuaded a powerful coalition of "content providers" that a
more balanced, genuinely negotiated set of ground rules was preferable to
no treaty at all."-' Once compromise became possible, the need to obtain the
votes of the Latin American, Asian, and African Regional Groups, coupled
with the self-interest of those groups in constructing a robust, worldwide
cyberspace environment, 1led
6 to hard bargaining and determined efforts to
reach a broad consensus.
In the end, the new WIPO treaties represented a balanced and
reciprocally beneficial set of foundational rules, with which each state
113 See

supra note 82 and accompanying text.

114 See, e.g., World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty, supra note
82, Preamble; Abbott, Enduring Enigma, supra note 39, at 512-13. See generally
Frederick M. Abbott, The Future of the Multilateral Trading System in the Context of
TRIPS, 20 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 661, 663-82 (1997) (discussing the
institutional roles of the WTO and WIPO).
115 See Samuelson, supra note 82, at 380-427 (discussing the bargaining process at the

WIPO Diplomatic Conference).
116 The author represented the International Council for Science (ICSU) at the WIPO
Diplomatic Conference in December 1996, and since then he has continued to represent
ICSU at various meetings of WIPO's Standing Committee on Copyrights and Related
Rights.

2000]

TRIPS: CONFLICT OR COOPERATION?

could adapt its Internet policies to its own needs. Thus, while both the
United States and the European Union have opted to enact legislation that is
far more protective than these treaties require, the rest of the world remains
free to adopt a less protectionist approach that would not, however,
undermine the global telecommunications network and the electronic
commerce it is expected to sustain.117 Having participated directly in this
process and in follow-up deliberations on related issues," 8 I am confident
that the WTO has much to gain (and many losses to avoid) by placing
greater reliance on these WIPO processes for the formulation of new
intellectual property norms to be incorporated into future revisions of the
TRIPS Agreement.
Meanwhile, at the WTO, the primary goal in the post-transitional
phase should be to find ways in which everyone wins by implementing the
TRIPS standards. When each of the developing countries comes up for
review by the Council for TRIPS, the developed countries should approach
the issues by asking, "how can we help you to implement these
international minimum standards so that you win and we win, too?"
Consider, in this connection, the possibility of linking targeted
technical assistance and public sector aid or investments to satisfactory
outcomes. This obviously includes technical assistance in training
intellectual property cadres and building intellectual property offices,
although there is some innovative thinking about even these mundane
regional cooperation so as to
matters.11 9 There is also a need to encourage
120
reduce everyone's transaction costs.
Less obvious is the need to focus on ways to assist the developing
countries in identifying areas in their own economies that can profit from
the global intellectual property system. Governments should encourage and
assist the developing countries to strengthen a "fair followers" mentality by
building up the capacities of their own national systems of innovation and
2
by helping them to improve the terms on which technology is transferred.1 1
In this regard, even simple or rudimentary improvements in the status quo

117

See, e.g., Okediji, supranote 50, at 176-79; cf Otten, supra note 3, at 533-34.

118 See supra note 116.
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"rapid-patent system with delayed examination" and a "system of reference" for granting
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120 See, e.g., de Koning, supra note 77, at 60 (commending cooperative and
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121 See generally Reichman, From Free Riders to FairFollowers,supra note 4.
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back them up with
can yield big payoffs if the developed countries 122
appropriate technical assistance and financial support.
For example, governments in developing countries can be encouraged
to foster the use of off-patent technology (including generic drugs); to
promote the study of patent disclosures, with a view to local adaptations
and improvements; to invest in expanding local reverse-engineering skills,
to be supplemented by recourse to the international labor market as the need
arises; to preserve and manage their biogenetic endowments, with a view to
directly participating in projects to explore and exploit these resources by
foreign firms; to promote the use of national trademarks on high quality
goods and to help publicize these products and marks in foreign markets;
and to identify local strengths, including cultural assets, such as design,
folklore, and musical or dance traditions, which increasingly lend
themselves to intellectual property protection and to commercial
exploitation.124
More ambitious projects could link effective implementation of TRIPS
standards with helping these governments to invest wisely in
telecommunications and Internet capacity. Particular emphasis should be
placed on maximizing access to scientific and technical data and
information.1 5 Developing country governments will also require
considerable assistance in stimulating transfers of technology from the
public to the private sectors.
In the end, of course, the developing countries' greatest need is to
make the worldwide intellectual property system work for them and not just
for coalitions of powerful rights holders operating from the developed
countries.1 6 To this end, I have elsewhere proposed a pro-competitive
strategy for implementing the TRIPS Agreement in developing countries,
which consists of the following five prongs:
1. Accommodating established intellectual property regimes to national
development goals;
2. Using competition law to curb the abuse of market power;
122 See, e.g., Maskus, supra note 56, at 488 (concluding that "concluding that
"stronger IPRs could have potentially significant and positive impacts on the transfer of
technology to developing countries...").
123 See, e.g., Martin J. Adelman & Sonia Baldia, Prospects and Limits of the Patent

Provision in the TRIPS Agreement: The Case of India, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 507,
510, 524-32 (1996).
124 See generally UNCTAD, TRIPS, supra note 50, at 29-52; cf. Abbott, Enduring
Enigma, supra note 39, at 519-20 (noting the role of the World Bank and other
institutions).
125Cf.Primo Braga & Fink, supra note 46, at 550-54.
126 Cf. COMPETITION FOR HIGH-TECHNOLOGY INDUSTRY,

supra note 45,

(stressing legitimacy of different policy goals for different economies).

at 51-54
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3. Fashioning new intellectual property regimes to stimulate local
innovation;
4. Resisting the drive for stronger intellectual property rights (absent
new trade concessions);
5. Strengthening national infrastructures for the acquisition and
dissemination of scientific and technical knowledge.'27
If, in fact, the developing countries were to move in this direction, they
would emulate prior pro-competitive strategies that the United States and
Japan practiced when they were still developing countries. In this regard,
perhaps the greatest contribution that governments in developed countries
could make would be to avoid thwarting these good faith efforts to balance
the TRIPS incentives against the need for access to intellectual creations
and for the benefits of free market competition. 128 Such a policy of restraint
would require these governments to avoid unnecessary confrontations and
to check the ability of private rights holders to convert the WTO process
into a circus of needless and wasteful litigation that would quickly dissipate
the good will and comity that all sides need in order to make this
experiment work.
2. Public-Private Initiatives
Let me close by calling attention to Professor David Lange's proposal
for public-private initiatives that constitute another means of bargaining
around the TRIPS Agreement. Because we have explained this proposal in
a recent article, 129 1 will limit myself to a capsule summary here.
In essence, we believe that government representatives, local
entrepreneurs, and foreign rights holders should negotiate on a transactional
basis to resolve conflicts arising from the TRIPS standards by devising
tailor-made deals that produce win-win solutions for all the protagonists.
Here, by government representatives, we mean that the relevant state
commercial entities and their overseers should participate at the bargaining
table in their capacities as economic actors, not as political exponents, in
order to secure implementation of private sector deals to resolve specific
intellectual property conflicts.
Presumably the presence of government representatives at the table
would ensure that any deals struck between foreign rights holders and local
firms would also redound to the public interest, without, however,
compromising the larger political organs' ability to maintain official
127
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positions on intellectual property law and policy in the relevant
international forums. At the same time, the government's representation at
the table should help to ensure that any deals struck would be implemented
in practice, with the backing of the relevant administrative and judicial
organs as the case may require.
While we believe that an endless array of intellectual property
conflicts involving specific foreign initiatives lend themselves to mediated
solutions of this kind, a hypothetical transaction might result in a specific
commitment to direct investment or to a transfer of technology by a foreign
rights holder in exchange for guaranteed levels of intellectual property
protection and enforcement that would remove existing obstacles and make
such an investment both feasible and reciprocally beneficial. Another
hypothetical transaction might result in the conversion of alleged pirates
into authorized licensees of the intellectual property in question, with
perhaps an understanding that the rights holders might devote a fraction of
their expected gains to defraying the costs of enforcement in poor countries.
In evaluating these proposals, one must take into account both the
limits imposed by basic TRIPS principles, especially the national treatment
and most-favored nation principles, and the need for the state's political
organs to defend their publicly held positions on intellectual property issues
while promoting win-win transactions in economies that are still susceptible
to considerable government regulation. As regards the first consideration,
so long as deals between foreign firms and local commercial entities (both
public and private) conferred no legal or administrative benefits on foreign
governments and did not entail legal or administrative discrimination that
favored nationals over similarly situated foreigners, there would seem to be
broad opportunities for resolving individual disputes on such a transactional
basis.""
At the same time, the tripartite approach to deal-making envisioned in
our proposal does seem to call for a special forum in which the public and
private sectors could negotiate confidentially without compromising the
political organs of the state in question. To this end, Professor Lange has
established an International Forum for Intellectual Property Initiatives
within the Duke Law School's Center for Global Capital Markets, which
alms to develop the specialized
expertise to facilitate the kind of public13 1
private initiatives we envision.
Such a Forum is also open to trade associations from both developed
and developing countries. It could thus encourage sectoral collaboration and
alliances between small and medium-sized firms in developed and
developing countries, which often have more in common with each other
130 See
131
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than with the larger firms whose interests have dominated the multilateral
trade negotiations.
3. The Long-Term Payoffs
The marriage of convenience between international trade law and
intellectual property law132 has produced powerful new institutions that
could stimulate innovation and invention on an unprecedented, worldwide
scale. 133 But the fragility of these institutions is easily underestimated
because the first five-year test run has benefited from the immunities
afforded both developing and least-developed countries during a
transitional phase. While least-developed countries will continue to enjoy
these immunities for at least another six years, the exposure of the
developing countries to the full weight of the WTO's dispute-settlement
machinery after January 1, 2000 poses a serious new challenge for the
stability of the international trading system established in 1994.
That system needs to survive the shocks and pitfalls likely to be
encountered in the post-transitional phase of the TRIPS Agreement. Let me,
therefore, end with a plea for restraint and for a more cooperative and less
confrontational approach than that which has sometimes characterized
relations between developed countries during the transitional phase.
Once the developing countries see that they, too, have a big stake in
the global intellectual property system, the long-term prospects for that
system would become bright, indeed. In the long term, we should expect
the economic stimulus of the TRIPS standards to influence business and
investment decisions everywhere, without regard to those North-South
divisions inherited from the Cold War that seem increasingly anachronistic
in principle, if not in practice. The trick, however, is to reach that long-term
understanding without capsizing the vessel on which we collectively
embarked in 1994.
Professor John Jackson once stated that, if the 130 or more states that
entered the WTO Agreement had really known what they were getting into,
they would never have signed it. 134 Having embarked on this great
adventure, however, it is well to recall the Italian proverb to the effect that,
if one finds oneself unaccountably at sea, the best course of action is to
keep on rowing.

132See
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133 Cf RYAN, supra note 107, at 141-58; Primo Braga & Fink, supra note 44. See
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(2000) (discussing the role of intellectual property rights in fostering innovation).
134 John H. Jackson, Remarks at the University of Michigan (Fall 1998).
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If developed and developing countries can learn to cooperate with each
other during the delicate, post-transitional phase of the TRIPS Agreement,
they may jointly preside over a new epoch of investment and technological
innovation. If, however, they insist on fighting each other to divide the
spoils from the production of knowledge goods at the end of the twentieth
century,1 35 they risk compromising the progressive and orderly
development of international intellectual property law within the framework
of the TRIPS Agreement. Such disarray could, in turn, destabilize the world
trading system as a whole, which will inevitably become ever more
dependent on the progressive development of that same body of law.
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